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A BEQUEST  CONSTRAINED  ECONOMY:  WELFARE  ANALYSIS 
ABS  IRAQI 
Bequest  constraints  have played  a  major role in discussions  of debt 
neutrality  but their welfare  implications  were not sufficiently  dealt  with 
in the literature.  In this  paper  we focus  on the welfare implications  of 
bequest  constraints. We found  that when institutional  constraints  to the 
transfer  of resources  from children  to their  parents  exists  the welfare of 
the parents'  generation  may be improved  by an old age security  scheme.  Such 
a scheme is  justified  not by income redistribution  consideration,  as is 
typically  the case,  but rather  on pure efficiency  grounds.  Due to its 
intergenerational  transfer  role the social  security  scheme  is Pareto— 
improving  with altruistic  parents  if,  in  addition,  the real  income effect 
which tends  to raise  children  consumption  is relatively  strong. 
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ISRAEL 1.  Introduction 
Bequest constraints  have played  a major role in discussions  of 
Barro's (1974)  debt-neutrality  theorem.  In his famous article (1974), 
Barro showed that if finite-lived  parents left their descendants positive 
bequests in the absence of government  debt,  the introduction of public 
debt would not affect parents' optimal consumption  plans and would not 
create  new opportunities to transfer resources  from parents to children. 
Barro's proposition thus requires an interior  solution or the absence of 
nonnegativity constraints  on bequests.  Subsequent  developments of this 
subject have focused on the implications  of such nonnegativity constraints 
and the possibility of boundary solutions;  see Drazen (1978),  Kimball 
(1987),  Weil (1987),  and Abel (1988).  This literature focused mainly on 
the positive economics aspects of institutional  constraints on bequests 
and their implications for government  debt neutrality. 
In this paper we focus on the welfare implications of bequest 
constraints  within the framework  of endogenous  fertility developed in 
Nerlove, Razin and Sadka (1987).  Gary Becker and Kevin Murphy (1988) 
pointed out the  importance  of bequest constraints  when family decisions 
(such  as fertility, investment  in human capital, etc.)  are endogenous,  as 
a source  of market failure,  for public  policies.  In an early  paper (1984) 
and subsequently in our book (Nerlove  et al (1987,  Chapter 8)) we dealt 
with a similar issue:  the welfare implications  of institutional 
constraints implying the inability of parents to force transfers among 
their children,  who have different  ability to make use of human capital. -2- 
When children have different  abilities,  so that investments  in their  human 
capital are not equally productive,  and parents cannot enforce transfers 
among them,  an egalitarian  parental  attitude may lead to inefficient 
investment in human and nonhuman capital.  For example, the parents may he 
led to invest too much in the human capital of the low-ability  children so 
that they will be equal (in the productivity  of their human capital) to 
their  more able siblings.  The resulting  market failure is shown to be 
alleviated  by a tax on earned  income  and a subsidy to bequest. 
In this paper,  we concinue this line of analysis dealing with the 
diseconomies associated  with institutional  constraints on the family  by 
focusing  on the  implications  of bequest constraints for the 
intergenerational  distribution  of welfare  when no differences  exist among 
children.  We examine several  potential  welfare-improving  policies 
designed to correct institutional  constraints  to negative bequests and the 
implications  of such  policies for population  growth.  Among such 
policies, we consider a social  security  scheme. 
In his pioneering paper,  Samuelson  (1958)  pointed out to the role of 
government debt (money)  as a social  contrivance for improving 
intertemporal allocations  of resources  within generations.  A social 
security scheme by which each young  generation pays a tax to finance a 
t:ransfer to the old generation  can, of course, play a similar  role.  This 
role is limited to intra-generational  transfers,  because in the original 
Samuelson's  overlapping-generations  model no intergenerational  altruism 
exists:  for each generation,  life-time  consumption is equal to own life- 
time income.  In the context  of intergenerational  altruism, social 
security can also play a role of intergenerational  transfers.  Such a role 
- -3- 
is particularly important  when there  is a binding nonnegativity constraint 
on bequests.  In this paper  we highlight the role of social  security in 
the Context of intergenerational  transfers  in the form of parents' 
investment in the human capital of their  children.  Even though  the social 
security tax is,  like most taxes,  distortionary,  it nevertheless improves 
welfare.  Other measures,  such as a subsidy  to human capital investment, 
are shown to be welfare-reducing  because they introduce further 
distortions into the economy without playing any role for 
intergenerational  transfers. 
The paper is organized in the following  manner.  Section II 
introduces  a stylized model  used to demonstrate  the existence  of a 
potential market failure arising from the  institutional  constraints  on 
bequests.  Section III provides a Pareto-comparison  between the 
laissez-faire allocation  and the optimal allocation (from  the altruistic 
parent's point of view).  Section IV considers the effect of the 
institutional  constraints  on the rate of growth  of population.  In 
Section V  we analyze alternative  corrective  policies for a 
bequest-constrained  economy  with endogenous  population.  Section VI 
contains concluding  remarks.  This section  is followed by three  technical 
appendices. 
II.  Bequest-Constrained  Equilibrium 
To highlight the economic  mechanism  underlying the problem at 
hand we use a simple stylized  model.  Suppose there are only two periods, 
two generations and a single  all-purpose  composite good.  The  first 
generation  consists of identical  individuals  (parents)  who live for one 
period.  Each parent is endowed with I units  of the composite  good.  She -4- 
consumes c1 units of the composite  good in the first period and bears n 
identical  children who each possesses  one unit of adult labor  in the 
second  period. 
Investing e units of the single  good in the first period in the 
education of a child augments  her labor  supply,  as measured in efficiency 
units, to g(e).  We assume  that the marginal product of human  capital is 
positive but diminishing,  i.e.: 
(1)  g' > 0, g" < 0. 
The child then earns wg(e)  in the second  period where w is the wage rate 
per efficiency unit.  Without loss  of generality  we henceforth set w—l. 
The parent can also bequeath b units  of the composite good to each child 
in the first  period.  This  bequest grows  to be bR units in the second 
period, where R  -  1  >  0  is  the  interest  rate.  For the sake of simplicity, 
R is assumed to be fixed. 
The  parent's budget constraint is  thus 
(2)  ci + n(e+b) — I. 
We  assume that bequests cannot  be negative.  Accordingly: 
(3)  bO. 
The consumption (c2) of each child in the  second  period is 
constrained  by: 
(4)  c  g(e) + bR. 
We assume that the nonnegativity constraint on bequest is only 
institutional.  Namely,  parents cannot  obligate their  children to repay 
debts that they (the  parents) accumulate  before they die.  However, the .5- 
economy lasts for two periods  and is not constrained in its ability to 
transfer resources from the future  back to the present.  For instance,  the 
economy (via the government)  can borrow in the present from abroad at the 
rate of interest R-l and repay the loan in the second  period.  Thus, 
constraint (3) is binding for the individual  but not for the economy.J 
Therefore, there may be a market failure  in the  intertemporal  allocation 
of resources. 
Caring about the number  and the well-being  of her children,  the 
parent in the first period  choose c1,n,e,b  and a planned c2 so as to 
maximize her utility function 
(5)  u(c1,n,c2) 
subject to the resource constraints  (2) and (4) and the  institutional 
nonnegativity constraint on bequests (3).  We call the  solution to this 
optimization problem, (c1*,n*,c2*,b*,e*),  the laissez-faire  equilibrium. 
When the institutional  constraint is not binding, namely the; parent  wishes 
to bequeath a positive amount to her children,  it is straightforward  to 
see that the parent invests  in the human capital of each child up to the 
point where the marginal productivity  of human  capital is equal to the 
rate of interest: 
(6) g'(e*) — R. 
The rate-of-return  equalization  ensures efficiency in the choice  between 
human and nonhuman (physical)  capital as means of transferring  resources 
from the present to the future.  Notice  that this efficiency  rule is 
obtained independently  of the optimal choice  of c1,n,b and c2.  (Of 
11 -6- 
course, (6) does not guarantee that the latter  variables are optimally 
chosen.) 
However, this efficiency  rule no longer  holds when the nonnegativity 
bequest constraint is binding.  In the latter  case b* — 0  and (6) becomes: 
(6a) g'(e*) >  R. 
This implies by (1) that investment  in human capital is insufficient.  The 
parent  would have liked to invest  more in the human capital of her 
children if she could keep some of the return to this investment to 
herself by  borrowing from  her children.  But thu  would have required  b to 
be negative which is institutionally  iwpossible.  In this paper we focus 
on this  bequest constrained  equilibrium  (b* — 0). 
There are several key factors  which determine  whether the bequest 
constraint is binding or not; see also  Abel (1988).  First, the magnitude 
of the parent's altruism towards  her children,  namely, the marginal rate 
of substitution of children's  consumption  for parent's consumption 
(3c2/3cl  along the parent's indifference  curve),  affects  the size of the 
total transfer (i.e.,  e+b)  to each child.  The smaller the magnitude of 
parent's altruism, the smaller  is the transfer and the larger is the 
likelihood that the nonnegativity  bequest constraint  be binding.  Second, 
the magnitude of the marginal productivity  of human capital investment 
(i.e.,  g'), relative to the return  on physical capital (i.e.,  R), 
determines the composition  of the total  transfer  b+e between b and e.  The 
larger is g', relative to R, the more that  parent would like to invest  in 
the human capital of their children,  and even  borrow for this  purpose.  In 
the latter case,  the nonnegativity  constraint  becomes binding. .7- 
In contrast to the parent,  the economy is not constrained  by (3). 
The optimum for the economy  is obtained  by maximizing the utility function 
(5) subject to the resource  constraints  (2) and (4) only.  The optimal 
allocation is denoted  by (c1**,n**,c2**,e**,b**). In this case b** < 0 
and investment in human capital is efficient: 
(7)  g'(e**) —  R 
(hence  e** > e*). 
Obviously not only investment  in human  capital is distorted in the 
laissez-faire  equilibrium  due  to the institutional  constraint  on bequests 
but also all other choice  variables (c1,n, and c2)  are distorted. 
Notice that our concept  of optimality  here is considered from the 
parent's point of  view,  namely,  the optimal  allocation maximizes the 
parent's utility function (subject  to the economy's resource  constraints). 
Since the parent is altruistic  towards  her children,  the optimal 
allocation  may plausibly lead to a higher  utility for children,  compared 
to the laissez-faire  allocation.  In this case the optimal allocation 
Pareto  dominates the laissez-faire  allocation.  However, this is not 
always true.  It may well happen that the optimal allocation  renders a 
lower  utility  (consumption)  for children  than the laissez-faire 
allocation.  In this case the optimal allocation does not bring about a 
Pareto-improvement  over the laissez-faire  allocation. 
III.  Optimum versus Laissez-Faire: A Pareto  Comparison 
As indicated in the preceding section,  parent altruism toward 
children does not necessarily  imply  that the optimal allocation  dominates 
in the Pareto sense the laissez-faire  allocation.  Namely, although the -8- 
parent's utility is, by definition,  greater  at the optimum than at the 
laissez-faire,  children  utility (consumption)  may be smaller.  To see the 
factors at play in the movement from the laissez-faire  to the optimal 
allocation and,  in particular,  their  effect on children consumption, let 
us consider a simplified  version of our model in which the number of 
children n is exogenous. 
Notice that  b is equal to zero at the laissez-faire  allocation and 
becomes negative at the optimal allocation.  Therefore, to analyze the 
difference between the laissez-faire  and the optimal consumption per 
child, let us parameterize  b  and consider the effect  on c2 of lowering  b 
from zero to its optimal  level.  That is, we first solve the problem 
max  u(c1,n,  c2) 
c1,c2,e 
s.t.:  c1 + n(e+b)  < I 
g(e) + bR 
where b is treated as a parameter.  We then  consider the effect of 
changing b  on the solution  for c2,  denoted  by 2  (b). 
A straightforward  comparative  statistic  analysis yields: 
.z  1  2  1 
db 
—  ((R-g  )n (u11-  u13u1/u3)) 




- 2ng'  u13 +  u33(g')2 
+ u3g" 
is negative by the second-under conditions  for utility maximization. 
Notice that  the expression  for dä2/db is composed of two terms.  The 
first represents the real income  (welfare)  effect of relaxing the bequest 
constraint.  Since the constraint is binding along the path from the .9- 
laissez-faire  to the optimum, then  g' >  R along this path.  Also, the 
expression  ull 
-  u13  u1/u3  is  negative  when  c2  is  a normal  good,  which is 
a plausible assumption.  Hence, the first-term  is negative,  working in the 
direction  of increasing  C2 as the bequest constraint is relaxed.  That is, 
the real income  effect  works in the direction  of increasing  c2 as one 
moves  from the  laissez-faire  to the optimum.  Thus, the real income 
effect,  as by itself,  enhances  Pareto-improvement,  when moving from the 
laissez-faire  to the optimum. 
The second term in the expression  for dä2/db  is unambiguously 
positive.  It stems from the fact that relaxing the bequest  constraint 
allows the parent to provide less consumption  for each one of her 
children.  Thus,  the second  term tends, as by itself,  to lower the utility 
of children in the optimal  allocation,  making the  laissez-faire  and the 
optimal allocations  Pareto-noncomparable.  If the  income  effect  on c2 is 
relatively  strong,  then  it dominates  the second  effect  and the children 
utility is higher in the optimal allocation  than in the laissez-faire 
allocation:  The optimal allocation  Pareto-dominates  the  laissez-faire 
allocation.  On the other hand,  if the real income  effect is relatively 
small,  the two allocations  are Pareto-noncomparable. 
The above analysis  was carried  out under the assumption  that the 
number  of children is exogenous.  However,  it should  be clear that the 
same factors  are at work when n is endogenous.  Indeed,  the children 
utility may well be lower in the optimum than in the laissez-faire  also 
when n is endogenous.  Appendix B provides  such an example. -  10  - 
IV.  The Effect  of the Beouest Constraint  on Population  Growth 
As was already  mentioned earlier,  a binding  bequest constraint 
forces  parents to underinvest  in the human capital of their children.  It 
may seem that this distortion  will induce  parents to bring an inadequate 
number  of children (i.e.,  n* < n**),  because they face a binding limit  on 
the "financing"  of children. 
This may indeed  be the case.  The loss  of utility due to the 
institutional  constraint  on bequest may lead to a smaller number of 
children in the laissez-faire  solution  relative  to the optimum.  To gain 
some insight into the effects determining  the difference  between the 
number of children in the two allocations,  observe that the laissez-faire 
allocation  with a binding  bequest constraint  can be represented  as a 
solution to the following  problems: 
max u*(c1,n) 
(8)  (c1,n) 
s.t.  :  c1 + ne*  — 
where u*(c1,u) — u(c1,n,g(e*)). 
The optimal  allocation  can be represented  as a solution to the following 
problem: 
max u**(c1,n) 
(9)  c1+n(e**+b**)I, 
where u**(cl,n)  — u(c,n,g(e**) +  b**R). 
In both (8) and (9) only c1 and n  are the choice  variables, while 
investment  in human capital  (e) and bequest (b)  are set at their 
predetermined  solution levels (e* and b* — 0 for the  laissez-faire 
allocation;  e** and b** <  0  for tha optimal allocation). A  comparison -  11  - 
between the above two consumer optimization  problems suggests two 
differences.  First, the objective (utility)  function is different. 
Second, the "price" of n  in the budget  constraint is different.  The 
laissez-faire  solution is suboptimal  because the transfer of resources 
from  parents to children cannot  be efficiently  channeled via physical and 
human capital investments.  If the removal of the constraint on the 
efficient allocation  of investment  between  human and physical capital 
leads to a larger total  yield (i.e., c2* — g(e*)  < g(e**)  + b**R — c2**) 
with a smaller total  investment  (i.e., e* > e** ÷ b**),  then it is 
plausible that the laissez-faire  rate  of population growth is too slow 
(i.e., n* < n**).  To see  this,  refer  to Figure 1.  The laissez-faire 
budget constraint AR'  is steeper than  the optimal budget constraint  AR' 
because the laissez-faire  price of children  is larger than the optimal 
price of children (e* > e** + b**).  If an increase in the quality of 
children (i.e.,  c2 — g(e)  + bR)  changes preferences  in (c,n)-space  in 
favor  of number of the children (which  is plausible) then the indifference 
curves  corresponding to u** are steeper than those corresponding  to u*. 
If furthermore  u** implies that the number of children is not a Giffen 
good,  then the optimal allocation  must yield  a larger number of children 
than the laissez-faire  allocation. 
However, this is not always true.  In fact,  the existence of the non- 
negativity constraint  on bequest might  have forced the parent to allow 
more consumption per child than otherwise  desired.  Hence, the removal of 
the constraint  will, in this case,  lower  the consumption per child, i.e. 
c2** — g(e**) +  b**R  < g(e*)  — c2*  (see  the preceeding section).  Since 
investment  is more efficiently  channelled  in the optimum, this will -  12  - 
require  a smaller total investment  in the optimum:  e** + b** < e*.  If, 
as before,, the decline in the quality of children changes preferences  in 
(c1, n)-space against number of  children,  then the  indifference  curves 
corresponding to u** are flatter  than those  corresponding to u* (see 
Figure 2).  In this case,  the optimal  allocation can be either  to the 
right or to the left of point D, shoving  that the optimal number of 
children can be either smaller or larger  than the laissez-faire  number of 
children.  Appendix B presents  an example in which the optimal number  of 
children is indeed  smaller than the laissez-faire  number of children. 
V.  Corrective Policies 
The source of the market failure in the presence of an institutional 
constraint on negative bequests is the inability  of parents to transfer 
resources from their heirs to themselves.  Such a transfer enables parents 
to have an efficient  number of  children,  to invest efficiently  in their 
human capital and makes parents  and, possibly, each one of their children 
better off.2 
A  first-best remedy to this market  failure  may seem to be a per- 
parent subsidy in the first period  debt-financed  by a head tax on children 
in the second  period.  However, notice  that  when fertility is endogenous 
(as is the case here), a head tax on children is not neutral, because it 
affects the "price" of children,  and thereby  distorts parents' behavior, 
In the absence of genuine second-period  lump-sum taxes  we therefore 
examine second.best  corrective  policies.  Such policies are aimed to raise 
the parent's utility beyond the laissez-faire  level,  but they cannot 
attain the first-best  level. -  13  - 
Consider then a consumption  tax at the rate t  (in the two periods), 
an education subsidy at the rate s', a child allowance of a', an income 
tax at the rate t  in the second  period,  and a lump-sum tax V in the 
first  period.3  Observe that this menu  of policy tools includes,  as a 
special  case,  a social security  scheme.  Such a scheme obtains when t'>O 
and T'<O, i.e.  when children are taxed  in order to provide a lump-sum 
transfer to parents.  The taxes  modify  the budget constraints (2) and (4) 
faced  by the parent to: 
(10)  (l+tc)cl+n(l5')e.a'fl  ￿  I-V 
and 
(11)  (l+tc)e2 ￿  (l-t')g(e). 
In what follows we examine the effects of sufficiently small taxes  at 
the neighborhood of the laissez-faire  allocation (tc*_s'*_a'*_t'*_T'*_O). 
Since at this allocation,  b* — 0,  we ignore  inheritance  taxes.  Dividing 
(10)  and (11) by (l+tc),  we see that the consumption  tax tc  ;is  redundant. 
We therefore  rewrite (10) and (11)  as: 
(l0a)  c1 + n(l-s)e -  an  I-T 
(ha)  c2 ￿  (l-t)g(e), 
where 
1-s — (l5')/(l+tc), 
a — a'/(l+tc), 
1t  — (lt')/(l+t), and 
1T  — (IT')/(l+tc). 
The parent maximizes the utility function (5),  subject to the budget -  14 
constraints  (lOa)  and (ha).  The first-order  conditions  are given in 
Appendix C.  Denote the solution to this problem  by: 
(a)  c1 — C1(s,a,t,T) 
(b)  n — N(s,a,t,T) 
(12)  (c)  e — E(s,a,t,T) 
(d)  c2 — C2(s,a,t,T) 
and the indirect utility function  by: 
(13)  v(s,a,t,T) — u(C1(s,a,t,T),N(s,a,t,T),C2(s,a,t,T)). 
The government,  which can lend and borrow  also over periods in which 
parents and children do not overlap,  faces the following  present-value 
budget constraint: 
(14)  [aN(s,a,t,T)  + sE(s,a,t,T)N(s,a,t,T) 
-  T)R 
-  tN(s,a,t,T)g(E(s,a,t,T)) ￿  0. 
As mentioned  before, we examine small changes in s, a, t and T around 
the laissez-faire allocation  (s*_a*_t*—T*—O). Totally differentiating v 
with respect to s, a, t and T yields: 
(15)  dv — v5ds + VadA + vtdt + VTdT 
— p1NEds +  p1Nda -  p2g(E)dt 
-  p1dT. 
(see Appendix C, equation (C6)).  Totally  differentiating  the government's 
budget constraint (14) with respect to s, a, t and T yields (at 
(16)  (Nda  +  NEds -  dT)R  -  Ng(E)dt — 0. 
We now examine the welfare effects of changes in each one of the 
distortionary taxes s, a and t, offset  by a change in the first  period 
lump-sum tax T.  These revenue-neutral  welfare effects are derived from 
(15)  and (16): -  15  - 
(17)  dv/ds  V5 + VTdT/dS 
—  p1(NE 
-  dT/ds)  — 0; 
(18)  dv/da —  p1(N 
-  dT/da)  — 0; 
(19)  dv/dt  — -  p2g(E) 
-  p1dT/dt 
— -  (p2R 
-  p1N)g(E)/R 
— p3g(E)R ￿  0. 
Thus, (19)  implies  that  a small income tax (in the second  period) 
which is financed  by a first-period  lump-ium subaidy (a negative T) is 
welfare improving.  This is a sort of an old age social security  scheme. 
The rationale for this  result  is as follows.  On the one hand  such a 
policy transfers resources  from the children to the parent and thereby 
alleviates the nonnegativity  constraint  on bequests and thus raises 
welfare.  On the other  hand,  an income  tax is distortionary  because it 
discourages  investment in human capital.  However, this distortionary 
effect is of a second-order  magnitude,  since  in general a small tax has 
only a second-order effect on welfare around the laissez-faire 
equilibrium.  Therefore,  a second-period  income tax with a first-period 
lump-sum subsidy increases  welfare.  Interestingly,  an income  tax is 
justified here on pure efficiency  grounds  rather than on the more 
conventional redistribution  grounds.  We also drew a similar conclusion in 
Nerlove et al.  (1984,  1987,  Chapter  8) in the context of differential 
ability of children. 
As should  be clear from the analysis  of section  III,  since the parent 
is altruistic, a policy  which enhances the parent's welfare may improve 
the children's  welfare as  well.  Indeed,  employing similar methods to -  16 
- 
those of section III and making  use of (16),  one can show that the effect 
of our social security  scheme  on the children utility (consumption)  is 
— 12 (g(u11-i  ul3)(  -1)1 + 
u3  [(g')2 
-  gg''] 
where 
D —  n2u11 
-  2ng'u3 + gu3 + u33(g')2  < 0, 
by the second-order conditions  for utility  maximization.4  As in section 
III,  there are two conflicting  effects  on c:  the  income  effect  works in 
the direction of increasing  c2; but the second term reflects the desire of 
the parent to lower c2,  as the bequest constraint is effectively  relaxed. 
4hen the income effect is relatively  strong,  the social security  scheme is 
Pareto-  improving. 
Equations (17) and (18) imply that  a small education subsidy and a 
child allowance  have no first-order  effects on welfare.  This is obvius 
since they do not play any role in intertemporal  redistributions  (since 
they are financed by a lump-sum  tax in the same period) and their 
distortionary effect  on welfare  is, as in general, only of a second-order 
magnitude.  Furthermore,  due to this lack of any intertemporal 
distribution role, one can show that  a finite education subsidy/tax  or a 
finite child allowance/tax  reduce  welfare.  To see this,  observe that the 
parent's choices of ci, n, c2,  and e in the presence of s, a and T 
satisfy the budget constraints: 
(20)  C1(sa,O,T)  +  N(s,a,O,T)(l-s)E(s,a,O,T) 
- aN(s,a,0,T) ￿  I -  T 
and 
(21)  C2(s,a,O,T)  < g(E(s,a,0,T)J. -  17  - 
Since  the government's  budget constraint  in this case is 
(22)  ..N(s,a,0,T) + uE(a,a,0T)N(a,a,0,T) 
-  T  — 0, 
it follows from (20) and (22) that 
(23)  C1(s,a,0,T)  + N(s,a,0,T)E(s,a,0,T)  <I. 
Thus,  the bundle chosen in the presence of s,a,  and T is affordable  under 
the laissez-faire  budget constraints  (compare  (23)  and (21) with (2) and 
(4), respectively).  Therefore,  an education  tax or subsidy and a child 
allowance or tax,  financed by a first-period  iump-sum tax or subsidy 
cannot  possibly increase  welfare.  Such taxes  or subsidies  will usually 
reduce  welfare. 
V.  Coriclusion3 
When institutional  constraints  to the  transfer  of resources  from 
children to their parents  exists,  welfare of the parents' generation  may 
be improved  by some sort of an old age social  security scheme:  a luxnp-suiu 
subsidy to parents, financed  by debt  creation to be paid by the revenues 
from an income tax on  children.  Such an income  tax is justified not by 
income  redistribution  considerations,  as is typically  the case,  but 
rather  on pure efficiency  grounds.  Due to its  intergenerational-transfer 
role,  the social  security scheme is Pareto-improving  with altruistic 
parents if,  in addition,  the real income  effect  which tends to raise 
children consumption  is relatively  strong.  If the model is extended to an 
infinite overlapping  generations  model,  the social  security  will not only 
tax children when they are young but will also subsidize  them when they 
are old.  In such a setup, social  security  is more likely to be Pareto- 
improving. -  18  - 
Other conceivably  corrective  measures such as subsidies to parents' 
expenditures on children's  education  or a tax on children are  shown o  be 
welfare reducing. 
We also explore the implication  of such a corrective policy for the 
children welfare and for the rate  of population growth.  We identified  a 
feature which can make this policy  to improve  the welfare of children. 
This feature is a strong  real income  effect on children consumption. 
Intuition suggests that  population  growth  will be greater when bequest 
constraints are eliminated,  or ameliorated.  However, this is not 
necessarily the case due to income  effects  and because of the trade-offs 
between numbers and welfare of children  are altered. 
Aooendix  A 
In this appendix  we describe  a simple  closed economy with overlapping 
generations in which a parent  is constrained  in her ability to transfer 
resources from the future  back to the present,  while the society  is not. 
Suppose an individual,  whom we call Eve,  lives for three  periods.  Eve  is 
born in the first period  in which she receives an education from  her 
parents and inherits  b ￿  0 from them  at the end of this period.  In the 
second period she works, consumes  and saves for the third  period.  In the 
third and last  period of her life Eve has children,  invests in their  human 
capital and bequeaths b' ￿  0 to each  of them. 
Now consider the third  period  of Eve's life.  In this period also a 
person from another  generation,  Adam,  who was born in the previous period, 
is alive.  Adam is in the second  period  of his life in which he works and 
can save.  Thus,  the society  can transfer  resources in the third period of 
Eve's life from  Adam to her.  Next  period,  Eve's children will be in the 19 - 
second  (working/saving)  period  of their  lives and society can transfer 
reso4lrces from them back to  Adam.  In this  way, society is able to 
transfer resources indirectly  from Eve's  children to herself (via  Adam). 
Eve,  herself, cannot  make such a transfer  due to the nonnegativity 
constraint  on bequests. 
Apoendix B 
Let the utility function  be 
(Bl)  u(cl,n,c2)  — c1  + an  -  hn2/2 +  nlogc2 
and let g take the form 
(B2)  g(e)  — 2eV2. 
The optimal allocation  is obtained  by maximizing (Bl)  subject to 
(Z2),  (2)  and (4).  The solution to a is given  by g'(e)  — R,  implying that 
(B3)  e** — hR2.  g(e**) — 2/R. 
Upon substitution, the optimal allocation  can be found  by solving 
(B4)  Max [I-(l/R2+b)n+an-hn2/2+nlog(2/R+bR)]. 
(b,n) 
The first-order  conditions  are: 
(B5)  -l/R2-b+a-hn+log(2/R+bR)  — 0. 
and 
(B6)  -l+R/(2/R+bR)  — 0. 
From (B6)  we can find the optimal bequest: 
(37)  b** — (R2-2)/R2. 
Assuming that R < 21/2  ensures that b** < 0.  Substituting  (37)  into  (35) 
we can solve for the optimal number of children: 
(B8)  n** — (logR + l/R2+a-l]/h. 
Substituting  (87) and (83)  into (4) yields the optimal level  of c2: -  20  - 
(89)  C2** — R. 
The laissez-faire  allocation  will have b* —  0  in this case.  This 
allocation  can be found  by solving the following  optimization  problem. 
(810)  Max (I-en+an-hn2/2+nlog2e1/2J. 
(e,n) 
The first-order  conditions  are: 
(811)  e+ahn+log2eV2 — 0, 
and 
(B12)  -l+l/2e  — 0. 
From (Bl2)  we can solve for the laissez-faire  quantity of investment in 
human capital: 
(813)  e* — 1/2. 
Substituting  (813)  into  (811) we can find the laissez-faire  number of 
children: 
(814)  n* — (-1/2+a+1og21/2)/h. 
Substituting  (813)  into (4) yields the laissez-faire level f  C2: 
(815)  c2* — 21/2. 
Comparing (88) with (814), we can see that if R  is sufficiently small 
so that 2(logR-i-1/R2)  < l+log2, then n* will be larger than n**.  Thus, 
there is no presumption  that a binding  bequest constraint  causes parents 
to bring a fewer than  optimal number of children. 
Comparing (89) with (814), we can see that since,  by assumption,  R  < 
21/2,  then c2* > c2**.  This result is in line with the analysis of 
section III which suggests  that when the real income  effect on c2 is 
relatively  small, then c2 is lower in the optimum than in the laissez- -  21.  - 
faire.  Indeed,  in this example c2 is a neutral good so that the real 
income  effect is zero. 
Appendix C 
The parent  maximizes  u(c1,n,c2) subject to the following  budget 
constraints: 
(Cl)  c1 + n(l-s)e  + nb -  an  I -  T 
(C2)  c  ￿  (l-t)g(e) +  bR 
(C3)  b ￿  0. 
The Langrangian  is 
(C4)  L — u(c1,n,c2)  + Pl[' 
-  T  -  cj 
- n(l-s)e 
-  nb 
+  an]  + p2[(l-t)g(e) +  bR  - c2]  + p3b, 
where i. P2'  P3 ￿  0. 
The first-order conditions  (when  constraint  (C3)  is binding, i.e., b — 0) 
are: 
(a)  u-p1—0 
(b)  u2 
-  p1(l-s)e + p1a — 0 
(C5)  (c)  U3  P2° 
(d) 
- p1n(l-s) + p(1-t)g' —  0 
(e) 
-  p1n  +  p2R  +  —  0. 
Notice that,  at the laissez-faire  allocation, (C5)(d)  and (C5)(e) 
imply that 
g' — R  + P3/P2 ￿  R 
which is (6a). 
Differentiating  (C4) with respect to s,a,t  and T,  employing the 
envelope theorem, yields: 





































)-  23  - 
Footnotes 
1.  A similar distinction  between the intertemporal  constraint faced by 
the  individual and by the economy exists  also in a closed-economy  when 
generations  overlap (see  Appendix A). 
2.  As shown in Section III, maximizing the altruistic parent's utility 
will lead also to a higher children  utility if the real income effect  on 
c2,  arising from the effective  relaxation  of the bequest constraint,  is 
relatively strong;  see below. 
3.  Since first-period income  is exogenous,  them an income tax in the 
first period is essentially  a non-distortionary  lump-sum tax. 
4.  As in Section III,  n is assumed exogenous in the derivation of 
dc2/dt. 
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